

An Updated Insider Threat Potential Risk Indicator Knowledge Base

*Workshop on Research for Insider
Threat (WRIT)*


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June 5, 2025


Potential Risk Indicators (PRIs)

My research emphasizes patterns of PRIS...



Framework for modeling insider risk based on behavioral, technical and organizational factors.

SOFIT: Sociotechnical and Organizational Factors for Insider Threat




SOFIT Ontology, developed under IARPA funding [Greitzer et al (2018)]



Executive Order
13587 (2011)




Original SOFIT PRI Knowledge Base – Individual Factors




[This is a subset representing approximately 15% of the entire SOFIT PRI Framework]

SOFIT 2.0 PRI KNOWLEDGE BASE




Three “D’s” Behind SOFIT 2.0

1. Difficulty **Differentiating** PRIs




Consolidation/ “pruning”

2. PRI **Decay** model concerns



Hierarchy restructuring

3. **Dependencies** at higher-order abstractions



Incorporating higher-level patterns

1. Consolidation / Pruning of PRI Hierarchy

Difficulty Differentiating PRIs

Criteria for merging PRIs:

- Same/similar definitions
- Same data / means of detecting the PRIs
- Same/similar mappings to threat behaviors

Example
(cyberloafing)

- Original SOFIT: **1.1.2. Job Performance**
1.1.2.1. Cyberloafing

1.1.2.1.1.	Excessive Personal Use Of Work Computer	Non-productive or personal use of computer at work.
1.1.2.1.2.	Excessive Use Of Personal Webmail At Work	Unsanctioned or excessive use of personal webmail at work.
1.1.2.1.3.	Excessive Personal Use Of Work Email	Unsanctioned or excessive use of work email for personal use.
1.1.2.1.4.	Excessive Browsing To Non-Work Related Websites	Excessive access to non-work related websites.
1.1.2.1.5.	Playing Computer Games	Unsanctioned or excessive use of computer games at work.
1.1.2.1.6.	Using Social Media	Personal use of social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, messaging) at work.
1.1.2.1.7.	Watching Online Videos	Viewing online videos (e.g., YouTube) for personal use.
1.1.2.1.8.	Online Shopping Or Gambling	Accessing online shopping sites or online gambling sites.
1.1.2.1.9.	Managing Finances	Accessing online financial sites for personal use.
1.1.2.1.10.	Job Search	Unsanctioned (e.g., excessive) use of work time/resources in job search.

- SOFIT 2.0: **100 Boundary Violations**
120. Concerning Work Habits
127. Cyberloafing

127	Cyberloafing	Excessive or unsanctioned use of Internet during working hours for personal purposes. [e.g., computer games, social media, online videos, online shopping, online gambling] .
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2. Improving PRI Decay Model

Initial model: PRIs decay based on **role type**...


- **Personal Predispositions** Greitzer et al. (2022)
- **Precipitating Events**
- **Behavioral Precursors**
- **Technical Precursors**

Inconsistencies were revealed in our research:

- Technical Precursors were assumed to exhibit relatively **high** decay rates, e.g.:
 - **Printing to Anomalous Location**
 - **Login failures**But:
 - **Introduction of Malicious Code** is a Technical Precursor with **low/no decay**
- Behavioral Precursors have mixed decay rates:
 - **Attendance Issues**: **moderate** decay
 - **Associating w/Extremist Group**: **low/no** decay
- Also: **SMEs reluctant to assign high decay rates.**

Updated PRI Decay Model

Exponential decay: The amount that a variable decays from one time to the next is proportional to the original value of the variable.




Examples

Decay Rate	Class	Sub-Class	PRI Examples
NONE	600 Criminal Activities	620 Criminal Record involving Violence	623. Exhibiting Violence at Work
	700 Ideology	740 Radical Beliefs	745. Express ill-will toward U.S.
	800 Psychosocial Factors	880 Personality or Character Traits	886. Narcissism
SLOW	400 Financial Concerns	440 Credit/Debt	442. Bankruptcy
	800 Psychosocial Factors	840 Interpersonal Issues	843. Anger/Aggression
FASTER	300 Job Performance	320 HR Concerns	324. Negative Evaluation – poor performance
	900 Cybersecurity Violation	940 Network Patterns	942. Use of unusual printer

3. PRI Dependencies: Higher Level Patterns


Most models assume that individual indicators contribute independently to the risk analyst's judgment of threat...

Greitzer & Purl (2022)




The SOFIT model incorporates higher abstractions...

"The Whole is Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts"



SOFIT 2.0

<https://cogility.com/sofit2/>



cogility.com/sofit2

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS


SOFIT 2.0 Insider Risk Indicator Taxonomy		UPDATE DEVELOPED BY: Frank L. Greitzer, PhD			March 2025
SOFIT 2.0 ID	SOFIT 1.0 ID	PRI Label	PRI Description	Abbreviated Citation	DECAY RATE
100	1	Boundary Violations	Action by a person that is outside of normal or accepted behaviors. This may include actions up to the level of organizational policy violations.	Bulling et al. (2008)	
120	1.1	Concerning Work Habits	Work habits and patterns that are potentially of concern for an enterprise.	Bulling et al. (2008)	
121	1.1.1	Working At Unusual Hours	Working at hours markedly different from peers.	Bulling et al. (2008)	MEDIUM
122	1.1.2	Poor Time Management	Poor skills in planning and controlling how one spends the hours in the day to effectively accomplish tasks; may be manifested by procrastination.		MEDIUM
123	1.1.3	Blurred Professional Boundaries	Interpersonal behavior, with colleagues or in professional setting, that is overly intrusive and/or overly personal, thus disrupting team morale/trust or mission focus; includes idle talk/rumors, especially about the personal affairs of others.	Bulling et al. (2008)	MEDIUM
124	1.1.4	Nonproductive Socialization	Excessive idle talk, socializing, or gossiping about private affairs of others during working hours		MEDIUM
125	1.1.5	Lack Of Confidentiality	Idle talk, rumors, gossiping---especially about personal or private affairs of others.		MEDIUM

MAPPING TO THREAT BEHAVIORS -- X = associated, Blank = unrelated


Fraud	WP Violence	Exfiltration	Espionage	Sabotage	UIT	Dom Terror
X		X	X	X		
		X			X	
	X	X	X	X	X	
		X			X	
					X	

Computing Risk: Cogynt Decision Intelligence Platform

Hierarchical Complex Event Processing (HCEP)




Counter-Insider Threat – Whole Person Behavioral Analysis




Risk Calculation

Cogility's patented **HCEP** propagates the PRI probability weights through the SOFIT behavioral analytic hierarchy at increasing levels of abstraction.



Example Scenario



Conceptual Illustration of Cogynt Model: Workplace Violence Incident

Based on Gabriel Romero Case [2019]




Sources:
[CDSE case study](#)
[Military.com article](#)

In December 2019, Machinist Mate Auxiliary Fireman **Gabriel Romero** reported for watch turnover aboard dry-docked Fast Attack Submarine USS Columbia at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, taking possession of an **M-4 rifle** and **M-9 pistol** for his roving Dry Dock patrol.


Without provocation, he began firing his M-4 rifle at civilians, killing two and wounding a third, before shooting himself with his M-9 pistol.

The incident only lasted a few seconds from beginning to end.

#	Event	SOFIT PRI	SOFIT Sub-Class
1 [June-Oct]	Tardiness	321 Attendance Issues: Tardiness	320 HR Concerns
2 [June-Oct]	Poor/declining performance	323 Negative Evaluation: Declining Performance	320 HR Concerns
3 [June-Oct]	Disciplinary action	341 Received Corrective Action	340 Nonjudicial Punishment
4 [June-Oct]	Yells at colleague, punches locker	843 Aggression	840 Interpersonal Issues
5 [November]	Employee passed over for promotion	361 Passed Over for Promotion	360 Concerning Job Status
6 [December]	Murder/Suicide		



Conclusions: Best Practices for Whole-Person Approach




The **SOFIT PRI knowledge base** provides a solid framework for characterizing behavioral, technical, and organizational insider risk indicators and contributing factors




cogility.com/sofit2



PRIs should include not only the most egregious violations, but also **concerning events, behaviors, and characteristics** that help to identify at-risk individuals and proactive opportunities for positive mitigation providing an “offramp” from critical pathway



Map the PRIs to **all threat behavior types** of concern



Behavioral analytic models should reflect high-level **patterns of PRIs** to provide greater insights than would be derived from merely aggregating the PRI weights independently

Questions?

Thank you for your attention



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Chief Behavioral Scientist


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[Cogility Insider Risk
Management Academy](https://www.cogility.com)

www.cogility.com

Works Cited:

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https://www.acsac.org/2022/workshops/writ/WRIT_2022_paper_4765-Greitzer.pdf

Greitzer, FL, & J Purl. (2022). The dynamic nature of insider threat indicators. *Springer Nature Computer Science*, 3(102). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-021-00990-1>.

Greitzer, FL, J Purl, YM Leong & DE Becker. (2018). SOFIT: Sociotechnical and Organizational Factors for Insider Threat. *IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), Workshop on Research for Insider Threat (WRIT)*, San Francisco, CA, May 24, 2018, pp. 197-206. DOI: [10.1109/SPW.2018.00035](https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2018.00035)
<http://conferences.computer.org/sp/2018/Resources/spw/2018/SOFITSociotechnicalandOrganizationalFact.pdf>

Other Resources:

Greitzer FL & DA Frincke. (2010). Combining traditional cyber security audit data with psychosocial data: Towards predictive modeling for insider threat mitigation. In *Insider Threats in Cyber Security*, CW Probst, J Hunter, D Gollmann & M Bishop (Eds.), pp. 85-113. Springer, New York.

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